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* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations.    1 Introduction
Connections between rms and politicians are widespread in most countries. They are
also highly valued by investors, who attach a signicant premium to the stock market
value of connected rms (Faccio, 2006a). The mechanisms inducing the (expected) prots
of connected rms to raise are largely unexplored, however, and can in principle bear very
dierent implications in terms of social welfare. On the one hand, rent-seeking practices
enacted by rms and politicians could impose large social costs on the rest of the economy.
On the other hand, if the competitive advantage of connected rms stems from higher
productivity, political connections might not necessarily imply negative eects on welfare.
Addressing these issues requires moving beyond nancial market evaluations of political
connections.
This is the rst paper to examine the real eects of political connections in product
markets. Our identication strategy is based on a simple theoretical framework allowing
us to quantify the private returns to political connections in terms of revenues and prots,
and the associated social costs in terms of misallocation of public expenditure. To estimate
the model, we assembled a unique longitudinal dataset matching detailed information on
a representative sample of Italian manufacturing rms and all of their employees with
administrative archives on the universe of Italian local politicians over the period 1985-
97.1
Detailed rm-level data provide several advantages for the purpose of this work. First,
they allow to identify connections on the basis of precise links between rms and politicians.
In particular, we will dene as connected those rms employing (at least) one individual
appointed in a local government. This is a meaningful denition because, dierently from
the national members of parliament, most Italian local politicians retain other occupations
alongside their political career. Moreover, despite being much less monitored than their
national-level colleagues, they manage directly over one third of the total public budget
(and retain much discretionary power over the allocation of the remaining part). Second,
the longitudinal dimension of our data set allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity,
time-varying shocks and for the selection of local politicians into rms, thus leading to a
much cleaner estimate of the eects of political connections. Third, detailed rm-level data
on productive inputs, output and prices permit to identify connection-induced demand and
supply shifts: distinguishing between the two is crucial in our framework for assessing the
welfare consequences of political connections.
According to our results, access to political connections increases rm revenues by
approximately 5%, yielding to an almost equivalent change in current prots (Figure 1).
 Contacts: federico.cingano@bancaditalia.it and paolo.pinotti@bancaditalia.it, Structural Economic
Analysis Department, Bank of Italy, Via Nazionale 91, 00184, Roma. We thank Antonio Ciccone and
seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, Universit a Parthenope and EIEF for their useful comments. All
errors are our responsibility. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent those of the Bank of Italy.
1In accordance with condentiality requirements, the dataset was assembled using a computer code
that automatically merges and encrypts the records contained in the original archives.
5These gains only accrue to rms establishing a connection through politicians appointed
with the party (or coalition of parties) that won the elections: rms connected through
other politicians see no increase in market shares, just as non-connected rms. These
ndings are robust to controlling for local and industry yearly shocks and for rm-specic
trends. They are also unaected when we restrict to changes in connections that are not
due to worker ows between rms, thus excluding the confounding eect of self-selection
of politicians into expanding or contracting rms.
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Note: These gures show the average dierence between connected and non-connected rms' prots,
expressed in constant 1991 Italian liras and then converted into thousands of euros at ocial exchange
rates. The gure on the left plots the residuals of a regression of prots on rm, province-year and
sector-year xed eects, averaged over politically connected rms around the year in which they get
access to at least one connection (year=0). The gure on the right plots the same variable for rms
losing all their connections.
The competitive advantage enjoyed by politically connected rms can in principle be
traced to alternative mechanisms, with relevant dierences in terms of welfare implica-
tions. On the one hand, higher revenues could reect greater productivity, for example
because employees accessing political power help reduce the burden of administrative
regulations (e.g. red tape). Whether such a channel entails a social cost is not clear,
however. According to the greasing wheel hypothesis (Kaufmann and Wei, 1999), these
practices would increase aggregate welfare by relieving economic activity from burdensome
regulation (Le, 1964; Lui, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). On the other hand, local
politicians could simply be driving public demand toward the rms they are employed
in. For instance, they could favor connected rms in public procurement, as shown by
Goldman et al. (2008). The misuse of public oce for private gains is a distinctive feature
of outright predatory corruption (Treisman, 2000) and entails large social costs in terms of
inecient provision of goods and services (Krueger, 1974; Mauro, 1998). This alternative
explanation is labeled grabbing hand hypothesis, after Shleifer and Vishny (1998).
6Our evidence is largely consistent with this second hypothesis. In particular, estimates
from alternative production function specications indicate that political connections do
not have any impact on productivity. Rather, the average eect on revenues turns out
to be driven by rms operating in markets in which public demand plays a major role.
Specically, it is entirely due to changes in domestic sales (as opposed to exports) and to
rms operating in sectors that are intensive providers of inputs to the public administration
(7.1%), and it is larger in regions characterized by high public expenditure (16.1%) and
high corruption (9.2%). The reallocation of market shares in favor of connected rms can
be associated in our framework to a reduction of around 20% in the provision of public
goods, compared to a scenario with no or ineective political connections.
This work is related to a recently expanding literature on the consequences of polit-
ical connections. Most of these papers detect (abnormal) nancial returns of connected
rms around particular events like national elections (Faccio, 2006a; Jayachandran, 2006;
Knight, 2007; Claessens et al., 2008; Ferguson and Voth, 2008), crises (Johnson and Mit-
ton, 2003) and news about politicians' health (Fisman, 2001; Faccio and Parsley, 2006);
political connectedness is dened on the basis of campaign contributions or personal rela-
tionships, the latter being mostly collected from newspapers. We rather focus on a direct
measure of political connections and depart from the event study approach. In both re-
spects, our work is closest to Khwaja and Mian (2005), who take advantage of a data set
similar to ours. However, they focus exclusively on preferential access to credit, which
is just one of the advantages possibly granted to connected companies. By contrast, we
investigate a variety of outcomes and distinguish between alternative channels through
which political connections may impact on rm performance.2
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines a simple
theoretical framework that derives the equilibrium distribution of market shares across
rms and the implied eciency of the public sector as a function of connection-induced,
rm-specic supply and demand shifts. We then discuss how to identify such shifts and
their implications for the private returns and the social costs of political connections.
Section 3 describes the main sources and features of our data. In Sections 4 we present
the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
Consider an economy inhabited by households, rms and a local government. Households
value consumption of both private and public goods. The former are produced by mo-
nopolistically competitive rms, while public goods are provided by the local government
using the varieties of private goods as inputs. Public procurement of these varieties may
respond to the existence of political connections between private rms and the local gov-
ernment. In this set up, we will characterize rm revenues and the eciency of public
2Faccio (2006b) and Li et al. (2008) also focus on dierent outcomes and channels, respectively. However,
their identication strategy is based only on cross-sectional variation in a single year.
7expenditure as a function of the distribution of political connections across rms and we
will derive estimating equations from these relationships.
2.1 Preferences and technology
Let C and G denote consumption of private and public goods, respectively. Specically,














where Qj is consumption of variety j and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
varieties. The latter are produced by a measure J of (monopolistically) competitive rms
according to technology:
Yj = Ajf(Xj) (2)
where Yj is the output of rm j, f(:) is a constant returns to scale production function and
Xj is the vector of production factors employed by the rm. The (positive) parameters Aj
and Bj are productivity and preference shifters, respectively, which may depend, among
other things, on the political connections of rm j.












where ~ Qj is the amount of each j-th input purchased by the local government. Political
connections may however distract public spending from its ecient allocation, i.e. the one















where ~ Bj  0 is a demand shifter that may also depend (analogously to Aj and Bj) on
the political connections of rm j.
2.2 Equilibrium
Households and the local government in each region take prices as given and maximize
utility subject to the budget constraints
R
J PjQjdj  E and
R
J Pj ~ Qjdj  ~ E, where E and
~ E are the aggregate expenditure by households and the local government, respectively,
and Pj is the market price of variety j. The implied total demand for variety j is then
Pj


























j dj are the price indexes for private and public








where ! is also constant across rms within the same market, depending only on the factor
prices prevalent in that market. Substituting the last expression into equation (5) delivers





















2.3 Estimating equations and identication
According to equation (7), political connections can aect rm-specic revenues only
through productivity and/or preference shifters. Distinguishing the relative importance of
these alternative channels is crucial for assessing their welfare implications. Our identica-
tion strategy will rely mainly on within-rm variation in connection status and outcomes,
controlling for transitory local and sectoral shocks.
Specically, let A, B and ~ B depend on political connections in the following way:
lnAjt = aj + art + ast + a  POLjt + jt
lnBjt = bj + brt + bst + b  POLjt + jt
ln ~ Bjt = ~ bj +~ brt +~ bst +~ b  POLjt + ~ jt:
where the subscripts t = 1;2;:::;T indicates years. The rst term on the right hand side
of each equation summarizes rm-specic, time-invariant characteristics; the second and
third terms capture, respectively, year t shocks specic to region r and industrial sector s
in which the rm operates; and jt, jt and ~ jt are normally distributed error terms not
correlated with political connections. Coecients a, b and ~ b represent the (percentage)
eect of political connections on rm-specic productivity and demand (either private or
public).
Substituting the expressions for Aj, Bj and ~ Bj into the revenues equation (7) and
log-linearizing it around A = B = ~ B = 1 delivers the estimating equation
rjt = j + rt + st +   POLjt + "jt; (8)
where rjt is the log of revenues raised by rm j during year t; j summarizes rm-specic,
time-invariant terms; rt and st reect region- and sector-specic shocks and "jt is an
error term. The estimating coecient  in (8) is the average percentage change in market
9power associated with political connections and equals the weighted sum of both demand
and supply eects,
 = (   1)a + (1   ~ e)b + ~ e~ b; (9)
where ~ e = ( ~ E= ~ P)=[(E=P) + ( ~ E= ~ P)] is the incidence of public demand over total sales in
the market.
In order to separately identify the dierent components of , we proceed in two steps.
First, we exploit the fact that productivity changes aect output for any given level of
production inputs, while demand shifts are entirely accommodated by expanding the scale
of production. Therefore, keeping constant the factors of production allows us to isolate
productivity eects from demand shifts. Specically, taking logs in (2) and substituting
the expression for Ajt, we obtain




jt + jt (10)
where xk
jt is the log of each k-th factor employed by rm j during year t and k is its
share in total production. Notice that now the coecient of POLjt in (10) depends only
on the eect of political connections on rm productivity (as captured by a). Therefore,
productivity eects of political connections should drive a positive coecient of POLjt
both in (8) and (10), while demand eects would show up in (8) but not in (10).
The second step consists in distinguishing between dierent types of demand eects,
namely from private consumers and from the public administration, as captured by coef-
cients b and ~ b, respectively. This is also a very important distinction because only the
latter cause a distortion of allocative eciency; the former just redistribute prots across
the rms active in the market. The relative importance of these two eects can be as-
sessed by comparing estimates of  across dierent markets. According to equation (9),
in fact, if demand eects occur mainly through public procurement, the increase in rev-
enues should be larger for rms operating in markets characterized by a greater incidence
of public expenditure in total demand (i.e. a larger ~ e in 9). The opposite would occur
if demand eects are driven instead by the preferences of private consumers. Therefore,
we will estimate equation (8) separately for rms operating in industrial sectors and/or
geographic regions characterized by a dierent weight of public demand.
2.4 The misallocation of public expenditure
The eect of political connections on public sector eciency depends crucially on the
channels through which they impact on rm revenues. If political connections mainly help
rms to overcome burdensome bureaucratic barriers, they would improve the eciency of
the public sector by raising the productivity of input providers. If, on the other hand, they
merely distort public demand in favor of connected rms, this would negatively impact on
aggregate welfare.
These two eects are intimately related with the dierent components of the coecient
10 in equation (9). This can be seen by computing the equilibrium provision of public good
G. Substituting the demand and supply of inputs to the public administration (equations
5 and 6) into the production function (3), plugging the expressions for shifters A, B and ~ B,
and exploiting the properties of the log-normal distribution delivers the change in public
good provision that is due to variation in productivity and demand across rms,















where lnG = lnG   lnG0, with G0 denoting the provision absent any supply and/or
demand shocks (i.e. A = ~ B = 1), and  depends on the variance of rm-specic shocks.3
Part of the dierence between G and G0 depends directly on the rst and second
moments of the distribution of political connections across rms. In particular, \greasing
wheel eects" increase public expenditure eciency by raising the average productivity
of input providers for the public administration (as captured by the rst term on the
right hand side). Since mark ups are xed and demand is elastic, this eect would be
magnied by the fact that greater shares of total public demand are re-directed toward
high-productivity, low-price rms (the second term). \Grabbing hand eects", on the
other hand, lower the eciency of public procurement by distorting the relative demand
for each input relative to its optimal level. Note nally that the benets (costs) of greater
dispersion in productivity (public demand) are increasing (decreasing) in the elasticity of
substitution . Intuitively, the higher the substitutability between dierent varieties, the
greater the advantage of shifting production toward the most ecient rms, and the lower
the costs of forcing a disproportionate share of public demand toward some rms.
The necessary conditions for greasing and grabbing eects to be dierent from zero are
that a and ~ b are also dierent from 0, respectively. Empirically estimating such coecients
is exactly the purpose of the next sections.
3 Data
Our data set consists of a panel (1985-97) of Italian manufacturing rms containing both
economic variables and yearly information on connection status. It is obtained combining
information from three main sources: rm-level balance sheet data, individual-level social
security archives and administrative registries on local politicians.
3.1 Employer-employee data
Our observation sample is an open panel of about 1200 Italian manufacturing rms (IN-











2V (~ ). The expression in equation (11) is
computed assuming that the rm, sector-year and region-year components in A and ~ B are all equal to 0.
11since the early 1970s to monitor investment and employment decisions. The survey was
integrated with balance-sheet data on revenues, exports, value added, real output, prots
and production factors available since 1982 from the Company Accounts Data Service
(CADS), a large data set collected by a consortium of banks to pool information on bor-
rowers.4
Firm-level data were further merged with a draw from Social Security archives con-
taining individual-level information on any worker employed by an INVIND rm for at
least one week over the period 1981-1997. In particular, the data contain workers' scal
identier which will be used to identify rms connected to a local administration. The nal
matched employer-employee dataset includes nearly 1.4 millions of individuals employed
in 1227 rms. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the characteristics of our sample.
3.2 Political connections
The Italian system of local governments comprises 8100 municipalities, 103 provinces
(95 until 1995) and 20 regions. Each of them is formed by a legislative council and an
executive cabinet. They are renewed through elections regularly held every ve years; of
course, earlier elections may be called if the executive resigns the mandate before its term
expires.
Within our sample period, local elections were held in 1985, 1990 and 1995, appoint-
ing a total of 307,783 local politicians; about 135,000 were in oce, on average, during
each year. Detailed information on each of them is available from the Registry of Lo-
cal Politicians (RLP), maintained by the Italian Ministry of Interior and made publicly
available according to National Law 267/2000, art. 76. The RLP records include (among
other things) the information required to generate the scal identier of each politician:
name, birth date and birth place (at the municipality-level). This allowed us to merge the
data on local politicians with the employer-employee dataset in order to identify rms'
connections with the local government.
Our main measure of political connections is a binary variable indicating whether
each rm has (at least) one employee appointed in a local government. Since the RLP
also reports the party aliation, we are able to further distinguish between politicians
appointed with parties entering the executive cabinet, i.e. parties that won the elections,
as opposed to minority parties. More specically, we dene POLCONjt = 1 if rm j is
employing at least one individual appointed during year t, and POLWINjt = 1 if the
rm is employing at least one individual elected in a party entering the executive. This
distinction is useful to explore the dierential eect of accessing actual administrative
power (as opposed to just be appointed in the local council).
Since our identication strategy is mostly based on within-rm changes in connec-
4The Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei Bilanci) collects detailed balance-sheet information
on sample of between 30,000 and 40,000 rms since 1982. The nature of the dataset (help banks' credit
decisions) implies the data are carefully quality controlled. Firms in the sample account for approximately
half of total manufacturing employment in Italy and for a larger share of sales.
12tion status, it is important that the indicators display enough variation along the time
dimension. This seems indeed to be the case in our sample. About 40% of rms switch
connection status at least once. These are the median rms (in terms of size) in our sam-
ple, as bigger (smaller) rms are always (never) connected through one of their employees;
see table A1. Over time, the average turnover rate is close to 6% per year, peaking during
the electoral years (1990 and 1995); see Figure 2. The number of connected rms is also
higher in such years, due to the fact that we counted as connected both rms entering and
exiting the connection status.




























































% of firms becoming connected (left axis)
% of firms losing all connections (left axis)
number of connected firms (right axis)
Note: This graph shows the turnover of connection status (decomposed by entry and exit ows) and
the total number of connections for the rms in our sample. The dotted vertical lines indicate the
electoral years.
4 Empirical results
Our empirical results are organized as follows. We rst estimate equation (8) to detect
whether within-rm changes in connection status induce variation in (the log of) revenues.
Focusing on the role of connections in the production function framework (10) allows us
to determine to what extent changes in market power can be attributed to the eect of
connections on rm productivity (greasing wheel hypothesis). Finally, to assess the relative
importance of public demand (grabbing hand hypothesis), we exploit rms' proximity to
public procurement along both sectoral and geographical dimensions.
4.1 Baseline estimates
Table 1 presents the results of baseline estimates on equation (8). The dependent vari-
able is rm revenues deated using 2-digit industry indexes from the National Accounts.
13In columns (1) to (3) we start by investigating the correlation between political connec-
tions and market power across rms. The data were cross-sectionalized taking within-rm
averages of both dependent and explanatory variables. Hence, in these specications
POLCON (POLWIN) equals the fraction of sample period in which a rm was con-
nected to a politician (to a politician elected with a party that won the elections). To
reduce the scope for omitted variable bias, we control non-parametrically (i.e. by including
category-specic xed eects) for dierences in industrial sectors, provinces and rm size
(as measured by total employment).
Table 1: baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cross section estimates fixed effects estimates
POLCON .376 .073 .031 -.013
(.081) (.166) (.013) (.020)
POLWIN .413 .349 .047 .056
(.080) (.166) (.013) (.021)
obs. 1227 1227 1227 12547 12547 12547
rms 1227 1227 1227 1227 1227 1227
rm FE NO NO NO YES YES YES
R2 .597 .598 .598 .934 .934 .934
adj R2 .552 .554 .554 .918 .918 .918
Note: The dependent variable is revenues at the rm level deated with industry-level
indexes from the Italian National Accounts. The sample is a panel of manufacturing
rms observed during the period 1985-97. Columns (1) to (3) present cross sectional
estimates on within-rm average variables, while columns (4) to (6) present (xed
eects) panel estimates on yearly observations. POLCON is an indicator variable for
at least one employee of rm j being appointed in a local government during year t.
POLWIN is an indicator variable for at least one employee of rm j being appointed
in a local government with the winning coalition during year t. Regressions in columns
(1) to (3) include group size, province and sector xed eects, while regressions in
columns (4) to (6) include rm, province-year and industry-year xed eects. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. ,  and  denote coecients signicantly dierent
from zero at the 90% condence, 95% condence and 99% condence, respectively.
According to these estimates, connected rms are characterized by signicantly higher
(average) revenues relative to non-connected rms. However, there are striking dierences
between dierent types of political connections. In particular, only connections with politi-
cians that won the elections seem to matter. Quantitatively, the estimated coecient in
column (2) implies that a one standard deviation increase in the (average) fraction of time
a rm is connected to a winning politician (0.42) raises its market share by 17% on aver-
age. Put dierently, a one-year increase in the length of a connection would raise revenues
over the whole period by 3.2%. Such large eects are likely to reect, to a great extent,
within-category spurious correlation between the likelihood of employing a politician and
other (possibly unobserved) rm characteristics.
For this reason, all other specications add rm, province-year and sector-year xed
eects. Identication of the eect of political connection thus exploits within-rm changes
in revenues and connection status conditional on aggregate (demand or productivity)
province- and sector-specic transitory shocks. Once we do that, the coecient of POLWIN
14drops by an order of magnitude to about 5% (as an average between the estimates in
columns 5 and 6), while that of POLCON remains not signicantly dierent from zero
(column 6). According to these estimates the only connections that matter are those es-
tablished directly with the local executive power. Throughout the rest of the analysis,
then, we will focus on POLWIN as our main measure of political connections. We also
tried alternative indicators, accounting for (i) the number of appointed individuals em-
ployed in the rm, and (ii) the size of the local administrations each rm is connected
to. Results are qualitatively unaected. We then stick to binary indexes for the sake of
comparability with the previous literature on political connections.
4.2 Robustness
In Table 2 we investigate the robustness of these ndings with respect to alternative po-
tential sources of bias. One rst concern is that there might be unaccounted (possibly
unobserved) factors aecting both the probability of being connected and within-rm
changes in output. In particular, fast-growing rms could be hiring workers more inten-
sively than other rms, thus raising the chances of employing a local politician at the same
time as market power expands, which would bias the estimated coecient upwards. For
this reason, in column 1 we allow for rm-specic trends (in addition to rm-specic xed
eects), which do not aect the results. Rather than following a linear trend, however,
production levels could respond to transitory rm-specic shocks. A more severe test con-
sists then in restricting the attention to those connections established and lost through
tenured employees, i.e. those who determined a change in connection status at year t and
were employed in the same rm also in previous (at least since t   1) and subsequent (at
least until t + 1) years. In other words, we excluded those cases in which the variable
POLWINjt changes only as a consequence of rm j hiring (or ring) decisions at time
t. This alternative denition does not aect the results either (column 2). Pushing this
argument further, we restrict to variation in connection status that is due only to indi-
viduals employed in the rst year the rm entered the sample, i.e. we exclude political
connections granted by (possibly endogenous) subsequent worker ows across rms. Even
in this case, results are not aected (column 3).
A dierent concern is that the correlation between output and political connections
picks up the eect of politicians' ability rather than their access to executive power. This
would be the case whenever productive human capital and political skills are correlated,
which is indeed a recurrent assumption in the literature (see, for instance, Mattozzi and
Merlo, 2008). For example, outstanding sales managers permanently raise gross output,
independently of other choices. But they might also be more likely to be elected than
the average individual. In this case the coecient of POLWIN would be capturing the
output consequences of having a brilliant sales manager, irrespective of the connection.
We net out these eects adding dummies for the presence in the rm of employees who
at some point establish the connection. This implies that  is estimated exploiting the
15Table 2: robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rm spec. tenured no wks. exclude
exports domestic
trend wks. only ows wks. ability
POLWIN .045 .049 .056 .062 -.0002 .044





obs. 12547 10734 10734 10734 12547 12512
rms 1227 1220 1220 1220 1227 1227
R2 .964 .938 .938 .938 .624 .898
adj R2 .955 .922 .922 .922 .534 .873
Note: The dependent variable is revenues at the rm level deated with industry-level
indexes from the Italian National Accounts. Cols. (5) and (6) distinguish between
exports and domestic sales, respectively. The sample is a panel of manufacturing
rms observed during the period 1985-97, with the exception of columns (2) to (4), in
which it is restricted to the 1986-96 period. POLWIN is an indicator variable for at
least one employee of rm j being appointed in a local government with the winning
coalition during year t. In column (2) POLWIN is computed excluding workers
entering/exiting the rm at year t, i.e. focussing on those being hired and/or leaving
the rm in year s 6= t. In column (3), POLWIN is computed further restricting to
the sample of workers already employed by the rm in the rst observational year
(in most cases, 1985). POLPRE is an indicator variable for at least one employee of
rm j being subsequently appointed in a local government with the winning coalition,
i.e. being appointed in year s > t. POLPOST is an indicator variable for at least
one employee of rm j being previously appointed in a local government with the
winning coalition, i.e. being appointed in year s < t. All regressions include rm,
province-year and industry-year xed eects, except in column (1) where we included
rm-specic trends. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ,  and  denote
coecients signicantly dierent from zero at the 90% condence, 95% condence
and 99% condence, respectively.
within-rm correlation between output and connection status net of the xed-eect trace-
able to specic politician-employees. We allowed for separate dummies, POLPRE and
POLPOST, equal to 1 before and after appointment, respectively, because the individual
eect might be dierent before and after the appointment, for instance because of experi-
ence accumulated or networks established while in oce (Diermeier et al., 2005; Kramarz
and Thesmar, 2006). While the estimate in column (4) is consistent with the existence of
positive returns also after appointment, the estimated eect while in oce is only slightly
aected (if anything, it increases to 6.2%).
Finally, in the last two columns of the table we start distinguishing among alternative
channels through which political connections may aect rm revenues. In order to do
that, we estimate the baseline specication separately for (the log of) exports and domes-
tic sales. It turns out that the increase in revenues is exclusively due to changes in the
latter component, while the eect of political connections on exports is not signicantly
dierent from zero.5 This last nding is consistent with the grabbing hand hypothesis,
5Since exports are censored at zero in about 45% of the observations, the dependent variable in column
(5) is, more precisely, the log of (1+exports), which is of course still censored. Nevertheless, we estimated
the export equation by OLS in order to sweep out xed eects, which may instead bias non-linear max-
imum likelihood models (see Greene, 2004). The Logit xed eect model does also escape the incidental
parameters bias through a within-rm transformation, but this comes at the cost of an information loss
16because domestic sales may possibly depend on purchases from the public administra-
tion while exports do not. Moreover, the absence of any eect on exports downplays
productivity-based explanations of the eect of political connections, which according to
the heterogeneous-rms-and-trade literature should result in higher sales in foreign mar-
kets (see Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al., 2007). Of course, domestic sales and exports are
very rough measures of public demand and productivity, respectively. We next turn to
examine more systematically these issues.
4.3 Productivity analysis
To what extent is the observed increase in market power attributable to productivity
changes? This important issue has received so far little attention in the literature. Still,
it is crucial to distinguish between ecient and inecient forms of corruption (and the
welfare implications that follow).
We identify productivity-eects by estimating the coecient of POLWIN in a pro-
duction function framework, i.e. holding the factors of production constant. Results are
reported in Table 3. In the rst two columns we augment (8) with measures of produc-
tion factors. In particular, in column (1) we include on the right hand side the (log of)
employment, physical capital and intermediate inputs (along with rm, industry-year and
province-year xed eects). Employment is measured by the total amount of weeks worked
by employees during the year, and the capital stock is constructed applying the perpetual
inventory method to the investment series. Both revenues and capital series are deated
using 2-digit industry indexes from National Accounts. Our result point to no signicant
eects of connections on rm productivity. The coecient of interest is not statistically
signicant even in column (2), where we adopted a (log) value added specication of the
production function.
Yet, industry-deated value measures of rm output would reveal productivity only
under very stringent conditions. The problem is that, whenever the market power of
each rm is non-negligible (as it is the case in oligopolistic markets) idiosyncratic supply
shocks induce simultaneous changes in rm-specic output and prices (not captured by
aggregate deators), which in turn bias industry-deated output measures of productivity
downwards; see, for instance, Klette and Griliches (1996) and Foster et al. (2008). Firm-
level price data provide a convenient way out of this problem. Information on prices
is available for a subsample of our rms. Starting in 1988, the INVIND questionnaire
asked rms to report the average sales price change over the previous year, pjt. The
response rate is 41.3% on average, restricting the sample to 719 rms. Column (3) reports
estimates of equation (10) after taking rst dierences and measuring the log-change of
real output as yjt = rjt   pjt (where  denotes year-to-year dierences). In line
with the estimates obtained using value measures of output, political connections have
due to the binary re-coding of the export variable. In any case, OLS, Tobit and Logit estimates convey
the same result, namely that political connections do not aect exports (the results for Tobit and Logit
are not reported but are available upon request).
17Table 3: production function estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
restricted coefficients sector-specific coefficients no factors
r va y p r va y p y p
POLWIN .001 .015 .003 .013
(.004) (.013) (.004) (.013)
POLWIN .004 .0008 .004 .0007 .028 .002
(.007) (.004) (.007) (.004) (.013) (.004)
control variables
lnL YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
lnK YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
lnX YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
lnL NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO
lnK NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO
lnX NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO
obs. 10169 10109 4074 4076 10169 10109 4074 4076 4074 4076
rms 979 979 718 719 979 979 718 719 718 719
R2 .995 .956 .81 .34 .995 .956 .815 .344 .26 .324
adj R2 .993 .944 .765 .185 .994 .944 .771 .187 .088 .166
Note: The dependent variable is reported on top of each column. r and va are (the log of) yearly revenues and
value added at the rm level, respectively, deated with industry-level indexes from the Italian National Accounts.
y and p are the log-dierence, between year t and t 1, of real output and prices at the rm level. The sample is
a panel of manufacturing rms observed during the period 1985-97. POLWIN is an indicator variable for at least
one employee of rm j being appointed in a local government with the winning coalition during year t. POLWIN
denotes the log-dierence of the same variable between year t and t 1. The table reports also the control variables
included in each column: lnL is the log of labor employed by the rm, expressed in terms of worker-weeks; lnK
is the log of capital, reconstructed using the perpetual inventory method; lnX is the log of value of intermediate
inputs; nally, lnL, lnK and lnX are the log-dierence of the same variables between year t and t   1. The
coecients of all control variables are restricted to be equal in columns (1) to (4); they are sector-specic in columns
(5) to (8). All regressions include rm (except in columns 3, 4 and 7 to 10), province-year and industry-year xed
eects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ,  and  denote coecients signicantly dierent from zero at
the 90% condence, 95% condence and 99% condence, respectively.
no signicant eects on productivity; rm-specic prices are also unaected by political
connections (column 4). Very similar results are obtained when we adopt a more exible
specication that allows the coecients of the production factors to vary across sectors
(columns 5 to 8).
One main concern with the last exercise is that the dierence between the eect on
revenues and output (Tables 1 and 3, respectively) may descend from dierences in the
sample and/or measurement error in rm-specic price changes. For this reason, column
(9) drops the production factors from the right hand side in order to replicate the spec-
ication of Table 1. The eect of political connections on output turns out to be of the
same order of magnitude and statistically signicant, which is a remarkable result after
considering that the sample is less than one third of the original one (Table 1). Finally, col-
umn (10) excludes that confounding price eects play any signicant role. These ndings
suggest that sample selection and/or measurement error play little or no role in explaining
the absence of an eect on productivity in the other columns of Table 3.
184.4 The social costs of political connections
Combining our previous results suggests that rms experiencing connection-induced in-
creases in revenues respond to demand shifts rather than to productivity pushes. To
distinguish public from private demand shifts, we will exploit between-rm heterogeneity
as to the weight of sales to the public administration. Ideally, we would want to look at
this measure at the rm-level. Unfortunately, neither the INVIND questionnaires nor the
rm balance sheets report this information. We circumvent this problem by examining the
heterogeneity in the eect of political connections across industrial sectors and geograph-
ical areas characterized by a dierent incidence of public expenditure over total demand.
These exercises are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4: the role of public demand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
sectoral dep. regional dep. corruption
high low high low high low
POLWIN .071 .006 .161 .032 .076 .022
(.020) (.017) (.063) (.012) (.031) (.016)
obs. 6915 5624 1769 10769 5450 7118
R2 .952 .933 .939 .936 .887 .934
adj R2 .936 .907 .902 .922 .857 .901
Note: The dependent variable is revenues at the rm level deated with industry-
level indexes from the Italian National Accounts. The sample is a panel of manu-
facturing rms observed during the period 1985-97. Columns (1) and (2) consider
only the subsample of rms operating in manufacturing sectors above and below the
median in terms of sales to the public administration over total sales, respectively.
Columns (3) and (4) consider only the subsample of rms operating in regions above
and below the median in terms of public expenditure over total value added in the
manufacturing sector. Columns (5) and (6) consider only the subsample of rms op-
erating in provinces above and below the median in terms of corruption, respectively.
POLWIN is an indicator variable for at least one employee of rm j being appointed
in a local government with the winning coalition during year t. All regressions in-
clude rm, province-year and industry-year xed eects. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. ,  and  denote coecients signicantly dierent from zero at the
90% condence, 95% condence and 99% condence, respectively.
The extent of rms' reliance on demand by the public sector largely depends on their
specic line-of-work. To attribute each rm in the sample a degree of \proximity" to public
demand we exploited the Italian input-output matrix and ranked manufacturing industries
based on the ratio of sales to the public sector over total sales. We then estimated the
eect of political connections separately for rms operating in industries above and below
the median of such ranking. The average ratio of sales to the public administration over
total sales in the two groups of sectors is 4.5% and 0.3%, respectively, while the average
over all sectors is 2.45%; Table A2 in the Appendix reports the list of sectors that are
most and least dependent from the public administration.6 The estimates presented in
6The measure of industry dependence on public demand was computed from the 2-digit IO matrix
issued by the Italian National Statistical Institute (Istat) in 1992. Specically, manufacturing industries
were ranked based on the fraction of demand of their products (\use") from the PA, Education, Health
and Waste sectors. According to this classication, industries with high shares of sales to the public sector
19columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show that the eect is signicant (at the 1% level) only for rms
operating in industries that rely relatively more on demand by the public administration.
At the opposite, the revenues of rms that sell their products almost exclusively to private
consumers are not aected by political connections.
Taken together with the productivity analysis above, this nding suggests that political
connections impact on rm revenues only through demand by the public administration
(as opposed to rm productivity and/or private demand). In terms of equation (9),  = 0
whenever ~ e = 0, which in turn implies that a = b = 0, or
 = ~ e~ b: (12)
This result is conrmed when we exploit variation in the relevance of public demand
across geographical areas (as opposed to industrial sectors). Based on recently issued
Italian Treasury data on expenditure by local administrations (Conti Pubblici Territoriali)
we distinguished rms operating in regions characterized by above- and below-median
values of public expenditure over value added in manufacturing. The average of this ratio
for the two groups of regions is 31% and 8%, respectively.7 While the eect of political
connections is greater than zero in both groups of regions (columns 3 and 4, respectively),
its magnitude is ve times larger in high-expenditure than in low-expenditure regions.8
These results are consistent with the grabbing hand hypothesis, according to which the
private returns to political connections are obtained by distorting the allocation of public
expenditure. A rst approximation of such distortion is provided by equation (11). We
may thus estimate its empirical counterpart by computing ~ b in equation (12) as the ratio
of the estimated  (equal to 5% in our baseline estimates) over the average ratio ~ e of sales
to the public administration over total sales (equal to 2.5% according to the input-output
matrix). After plugging the sample variance of POLWIN (0.247), the baseline estimate
of the misallocation of public expenditure implied by political connections depends on the
elasticity of substitution only. As plotted in Figure 3, the extent of the loss ranges between
0 with perfect substitutability (i.e.  ! 1, a case in which all varieties are identical and
include for example basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations, medical and precision
instruments, and manufacture of farm products. Among low-dependence industries are textiles, footwear
and the manufacture of agricultural products.
7Specically, we computed the average current and capital expenditure in infrastructures (as de-
ned by the Italian Treasury, see http://www.dps.mef.gov.it/cpt/cpt.asp) by Italian local administra-
tions in 1996 and 1997, the rst two years for which such data are available. The corresponding g-
ures for industry value added were taken from the Regional Economic Accounts (Conti Territoriali, see
http://www.istat.it/conti/territoriali). According to these calculations, the high-expenditure regions are
Valle d'Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige and Liguria (North), Lazio and Molise (Centre), and Campania, Basil-
icata, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna (South).
8Because it includes items other than direct purchases from manufacturing industries, this (geographi-
cal) measure of dependence does not capture the incidence of sales to the public administration over total
sales as precisely as the (sectoral) measure based on input-output coecients; in particular, the rst mea-
sure over estimates the incidence of public demand over total sales. It does adequately capture relative
dierences in the reliance on public demand across geographical areas, though, under the assumption that
the fraction of public resources directed to manufactures is constant across regions (e.g. it depends only
on the \technological", sectoral coecients).
20the very concept of misallocation loses signicance) to slightly more than 50% when  tends
to 1 (i.e. substituting between dierent varieties is costly). In an analogous exercise, Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) assume an elasticity of substitution equal to 3 (based on estimates by
Broda and Weinstein, 2006) which in our case implies a decrease in the provision of public
good equal to 18% (relative to the case without political connections and for any given
level of public expenditure).
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Note: This graph shows the estimated degree of misallocation of public expenditure due to political
connections, as measured by the variation in public good provision implied by equation (11). Both
average and area-specic eects are reported. High and low public expenditure areas include regions
above and below the median in terms of public expenditure over total value added in manufacturing,
respectively. High and low corruption areas include provinces above and below the median in terms
of parliamentary malfeasance, as measured by Golden (2007).
The same graph also plots the (estimated) degrees of misallocation in regions charac-
terized by high and low public expenditure, which turn out to be greater and lower than
in the baseline case, respectively. This is because the estimated revenue premium () in
high versus low expenditure regions varies more than the incidence of public expenditure
in manufacturing (~ e) implying a larger value of ~ b in the former group of regions. This
nding may be interpreted as a higher degree of rent-seeking (as captured by ~ b) arising
in regions where the payos from such activities are greater (i.e. public expenditure is
higher).
In order to explicitly isolate the role of dierences in attitudes toward rent-seeking, in
the last two columns of Table 4 we separately estimate the eect of connections in provinces
that lie above and below the median in terms of corruption, as measured by the incidence
of political malfeasance during the period 1948-93. This measures was constructed starting
from the detailed information collected by Golden (2007) concerning all requests by the
Italian judiciary to remove parliamentary immunity in the post-war period.9 As can be
9In order to investigate a legislator for suspected criminal wrongdoing, the Italian constitution required
21seen from the map in Figure 4, this approach produces a signicant overlap with variation
in public expenditure, both measures broadly yielding the north-south divide with some
relevant exceptions. Results in columns 5 and 6 show that the returns to connections
are signicant only for rms located in high corruption areas. The implied distance in
the degree of misallocation between high and low corruption regions is analogous to that
estimated in regions characterized by high and low public expenditure, although with a
slightly lower absolute level (see Figure 3).10
Figure 4: Regional characteristics
public expenditure corruption
Note: These gures show the distribution of public expenditure across Italian regions and of corrup-
tion across provinces. Darker colors denote regions and provinces above the median in terms of each
variable.
Combining the sectoral and the geographical dimensions conrms that the average
estimated eect of connections on market shares is mainly driven by rms featuring
both technological proximity to public demand and localization in high-expenditure, high-
propensity to ocial misconduct areas. This can be seen in Table 5, where we reported
the results obtained running our revenues regression on separate subsamples correspond-
ing to the intersection of the sectoral and (each of the two) geographical breakdowns.
The estimated coecient is never statistically signicant for rms operating in sectors
with limited (technological) interaction with the public administration (second row). On
the other hand, it is always signicant and higher in magnitude (up to ve times larger
(until 1993) a majority vote by the oor of the relevant chamber to remove immunity. Most of the times
such requests were not granted.
10These ndings are unaected when using an alternative, \missing-expenditure" index of corruption,
namely the dierence between the cumulative amount of public resources devoted to public works in each
province and the physical quantities of realized infrastructures (after controlling for other determinants of
the costs of construction), as computed by Golden and Picci (2005). The rationale of this approach is that,
keeping constant the technological determinants of production costs, the residual of public expenditure per
unit of infrastructure can be attributed to bribes and other forms of corruption (see also Olken, 2009)
22than the average eect) for highly dependent rms located in high expenditure and high
corruption areas (rst row).
Table 5: the role of public demand (sectors  regions)
sectoral dep.
regional dep. corruption
high low high low
high
.248 .051 .111 .026
(.070) (.017) (.031) (.029)
low
.028 -.001 -.023 .002
(.068) (.023) (.041) (.025)
Note: The dependent variable is yearly revenues at the rm level, deated
with industry-level indexes from the Italian National Accounts. The sample
is a panel of manufacturing rms observed during the period 1985-97. This
table reports the coecients and standard errors of POLWIN, an indica-
tor variable for at least one employee of rm j being appointed in a local
government with the winning coalition during year t, estimated on dierent
subsamples. The upper and lower row restrict the sample to rms operating
in manufacturing sectors above and below the median in terms of sales to the
public administration over total sales, respectively. Columns (1) and (2) re-
strict the sample to rms operating in regions above and below the median in
terms of public expenditure over total value added in the manufacturing sec-
tor. Columns (3) and (4) restrict the sample to rms operating in provinces
above and below the median in terms of corruption, respectively. All re-
gressions include rm, province-year and industry-year xed eects. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. ,  and  denote coecients signicantly
dierent from zero at the 90% condence, 95% condence and 99% condence,
respectively.
4.5 The private returns to political connections
Finally, we quantify the private returns to political connections in terms of additional
prots earned by rm owners. In Table 6 we thus replicate our baseline revenues regression
(i.e. the specication of column 5 in Table 1) replacing the dependent variable with
alternative measures of prots. The rst such measure is Earnings Before Interests Taxes
Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA), which takes non-negative values in almost all
observations and can therefore be taken in log, thus favoring comparability with the results
for revenues. Estimates in column (1) indicate that rms see a 5% increase in EBITDA in
correspondance of the connection period, nearly the same increase experienced by revenues.
To check whether this result is aected by the dierent impact of interest payment and
depreciation gures, in column (2) we used rms' prots (Earnings Before Taxes, EBT).
Since this gure is negative in more than one fourth of cases, it is taken in levels rather
than in logs. Results indicate that establishing a connection increases EBT on average by
900 thousands euros with respect to the baseline scenario. For comparison, the distance
between prots of rms at the 50th and rms at the 75th percentile in our sample is slightly
less than 1600 thousands euros.11 In column (3) we look at what these results imply for
11Similar results, not reported here for brevity, are obtained using operating prots (Earnings Before
Interests and Taxes, EBIT).
23protability, as measured by the Return on Asset (ROA). According to our estimates,
the latter increases by more than 0.7 percentage point in connected rms (the 50th and
the 75th percentile dierence amounting to about 4 percentage points). Regressions of
income and total tax rates paid out by the rm, reported in columns (4) and (5), conrm
that higher protability descends directly from changes in revenues rather than from lower
taxes, the eect on taxes being not signicantly dierent from zero. This is consistent with
the fact that taxes in Italy are largely beyond the control of local politicians.
Table 6: prots
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln EBT ROA tax (income) tax (total)
POLWIN .049 907.6 .703 -.037 -.055
(.023) (353.9) (.221) (.036) (.039)
obs. 11692 12551 12551 12530 12530
rms 1218 1227 1227 1226 1226
R2 .866 .341 .623 .227 .228
adj R2 .832 .183 .533 .041 .043
Note: The dependent variables is reported on top of each column. ln is the log of
Earnings Before Interests Taxes Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA); EBT is
Earnings Before Taxes; ROA is Return on Assets; tax (income) is the rate of income
taxes over EBT; tax (total) is the rate of total taxes (income and property) over
EBT. The sample is a panel of manufacturing rms observed during the period
1985-97. POLWIN is an indicator variable for at least one employee of rm j
being appointed in a local government with the winning coalition during year t.
All regressions include rm, province-year and industry-year xed eects. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. ,  and  denote coecients signicantly dierent
from zero at the 90% condence, 95% condence and 99% condence, respectively.
5 Conclusions
Connections between rms and the public administration are widespread throughout most
countries in the World. The advantages granted by such linkages, in terms of market
power and prots, are often criticized on both ethical and eciency grounds. Our analysis
deals with the second dimension, asking in particular whether the existence of political
connections conditions the eciency of public sector activity.
Our results conrm that this is the case. We nd that greater market power expe-
rienced by politically connected rms is not driven by higher productivity; rather, it is
propped up by greater sales to the public administration. These gains are larger the higher
the degree of corruption. Such ndings suggest that political connection may entail sig-
nicant aggregate economic losses. At the same time, they also suggest that the severity
of these losses depends strongly on the set of external conditions present in each economy.
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Appendix
Table A1: summary statistics
summary statistics standard deviation distribution
obs. rms mean overall between within 10th pc. 50th pc. 90th pc.
all rms
Total revenues, ths. e 12,547 1,227 90,273 486,623 442,100 91,451 5,802 23,942 169,000
Value added, ths.e 12,547 1,227 24,610 110,894 101,527 28,200 1,939 7,256 46,931
Exports, ths.e 12,547 1,227 22,303 161,926 141,355 53,947 0 934 36,152
Domestic sales, ths.e 12,547 1,227 67,970 340,040 309,113 74,875 4,026 17,986 130,000
r 12,547 1,227 10.232 1.342 1.308 0.407 8.666 10.083 12.037
va 12,459 1,226 9.046 1.268 1.235 0.381 7.593 8.900 10.761
ln(1+Exports) 12,547 1,227 5.022 4.686 3.513 3.233 0.000 6.841 10.496
ln(Domestic) 12,512 1,227 9.912 1.413 1.341 0.500 8.316 9.801 11.775
y 5,075 1,070 -0.002 0.262 0.179 0.226 -0.206 0.001 0.202
p 5,191 1,082 0.032 0.068 0.047 0.058 -0.030 0.035 0.090
Workers 12,547 1,227 895 2,473 2,373 386 113 355 1,708
Capital, ths.e 10,278 987 49,703 299,469 278,228 39,499 2,170 11,368 85,994
Intermediate inputs, ths.e 12,547 1,227 65,920 382,704 343,804 82,642 3,470 16,277 120,000
EBITDA, ths.e 12,547 1,227 8,039 39,788 28,129 27,390 216 2,129 17,024
ROA, % 12,547 1,227 9.435 10.546 8.431 7.443 0.052 8.297 21.453
EBT, ths.e 12,547 1,227 2,630 31,602 19,395 26,465 -1,066 408 8,337
Total wages, ths.e 12,547 1,227 15,673 46,126 45,062 6,688 1,519 5,124 32,270
POLWIN 12,547 1,227 0.552 0.497 0.419 0.279 0 1 1
POLCON 12,547 1,227 0.617 0.486 0.416 0.265 0 1 1
rms that are always connected
Total revenues, ths. e 5,041 513 183,287 756,723 672,939 143,479 11,384 58,561 374,841
Value added, ths.e 5,041 513 49,662 171,456 153,609 44,230 3,662 17,836 95,509
Exports, ths.e 5,041 513 47,304 252,907 216,054 84,629 0 5,569 94,281
Workers 5,041 513 1,741 3,725 3,508 605 210 815 3,289
rms that are connected in some years
Total revenues, ths. e 4,766 426 31,966 42,624 42,605 14,075 5,882 19,257 70,751
Value added, ths.e 4,766 426 8,997 11,227 10,589 4,612 1,994 5,748 18,760
Exports, ths.e 4,766 426 6,219 14,111 13,329 8,020 0 300 17,000
Workers 4,766 426 397 362 348 59 116 301 781
rms that are never connected
Total revenues, ths. e 2,740 288 20,570 33,534 39,017 9,138 3,956 10,549 43,641
Value added, ths.e 2,740 288 5,676 8,866 10,158 2,398 1,382 3,219 10,918
Exports, ths.e 2,740 288 4,285 11,554 11,297 6,291 0 0 11,756
Workers 2,740 288 206 178 180 28 84 159 381
Note: This table reports the main characteristics of the rms in our sample and of the sub-groups of rms that are
always, sometimes and never connected, respectively. The symbol (ths.) e denotes variables expressed in constant
1991 Italian liras and then converted into (thousands of) euros at ocial exchange rates.
27Table A2: Dependence on Public Demand
sectors dependence
most dependent sectors
25 Pharmaceutical products 39.92%
49 Building and repairing of ships and boats 11.75%
51 Manufacture of planes, aircrafts and spacecrafts 9.48%
20 Pulp, paper and paper product 4.63%
21 Publishing and printing 4.61%
24 Chemicals and chemical products 4.49%
54 Other manufacturing industries 4.22%
22 Manufactures of coke and petroleum products 3.72%
27 Rubber products 3.15%
43 Manufacture of communication equipment 3.00%
45 Manufacture of medical and precision instruments 2.78%
55 Recycling 2.25%
least dependent sectors
13 Tobacco and beverages 0.20%
12 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds 0.20%
18 Manufacture of footwear 0.13%
14 Fabric and Textiles 0.13%
46 Optical equipment 0.07%
50 Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock 0.02%
39 Manufacture of computers and other information processing equipment 0.01%
38 Manufacture of domestic appliances n.e.c. 0.00%
40 Manufacture of electrical equipment for engine and other 0.00%
42 Manufacture of electronic components 0.00%
44 Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording 0.00%
53 Manufacture of watches and clocks 0.00%
Note: This table reports the sectors characterized by the highest and lowest incidence of sales to the public admin-
istration over total sales. The measure of industry dependence on public demand was computed from the 2-digit
IO matrix issued by the Italian National Statistical Institute (Istat) in 1992. Specically, manufacturing industries
were ranked based on the fraction of demand of their products (\use") from the PA, Education, Health and Waste
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